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SUMMARY 
This working paper is based on the empirical research 
on translocal figurations of displacement of Syrians in 
Jordan. It contains methodological discussions, central 
findings and reflections on these findings. Drawing 
on the conceptual framework of the TRAFIG project, 
this paper explores the central research question of 
TRAFIG, namely “how are protractedness, dependen-
cy, and vulnerability related to the factors of local and 
translocal connectivity and mobility, and in turn, how 
can connectivity and mobility be utilized to enhance 
the self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of 
displaced people?” The paper presents findings from 
Jordan, where Syrian refugees have sought refuge in 
host communities.
Syrian refugees’ stay in Jordan has become increasingly 
protracted, with the durable solutions of return in 
safety and dignity, local integration and resettlement 
remaining out of reach for most. In this paper, we 
argue that Syrians are de facto integrated in Jordanian 
host communities due to shared language, religion and 
socio-cultural ties as a pragmatic strategy for dealing 
with uncertainty and protracted displacement. We 
found that family- and kin networks have proven vital 
in facilitating and protecting mobility out of Syria and 
within Jordan, even as these networks are strained due 
to physical and geographic distance, reliant upon aid 
and financial support and socio-economic stress in the 
local labour market. We see that Syrians experience 
uncertain futures in which their mobility aspirations 
are unrealised, economic prospects are reliant upon 
and highly competitive with others, and connectivity 
with the host community is strained and can be  
improved. 
KEYWORDS
Protracted displacement, Syrian refugees, connectivity, 
mobility, refugee-host relations, local integration,  
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Introduction
No one has forced us to stay here in Ramtha 
[Jordan], but we stay because it’s cheaper than 
other places. And the culture and lifestyle are 
more similar to Dara(a), Syria. I prefer this to 
Irbid [Jordan] because the local Jordanians are 
more understanding and flexible. For example, 
the landlord can accept not getting rent for two 
months. In Irbid, they would go to court to get 
the rent. It’s too hard in Jordan, and it’s really 
expensive. I have some distant family members 
who have returned to Syria who regretted it. They 
remind me to stay in Jordan because it’s better for 
us and safer here. And if we return to Syria, the 
boys will be taken by the army. I talk on the phone 
with my family in Syria sometimes, but the police 
there are always listening. Once I was foolish 
enough to ask them about returning to Syria, and 
my sister said, ‘Shut up! Don’t talk about this!’ If 
the regime knows we are coming back, they will 
take my sons immediately. The war has split my 
family and I more than ever. Everyone is thinking 
of themselves. The war has made us crude. My 
neighbours are respectful, but we aren’t close. No 
one supports me. I have no one to complain to, I 
only can say ‘Al-Hamdulilah’ (praise God) 
Umm-Bahaa (SsInt-YU-RF-001-JOR). 
This working paper describes and analyses empirical data that 
have been collected in Jordan as part of the “Transnational 
Figurations of Displacement” (TRAFIG) project, funded by the 
European Union and coordinated by BICC (Bonn International 
Center for Conversion). The overall objective of TRAFIG is 
“to contribute to the development of alternative solutions to 
protracted displacement that are better tailored to the needs and 
capacities of persons affected by displacement” (Etzold et al., 
2019). The main question that our research aims to answer is: 
How are protractedness, dependency and vulnerability related 
to the factors of local and translocal connectivity and mobility, 
and, in turn, how can connectivity and mobility be utilised 
to enhance the self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of 
displaced people?
Theoretically, our research is grounded in figurational sociology 
(Elias, 1978), which means that we pay attention to the networks 
and interdependencies of displaced people. Through a process- 
oriented approach, we analyse these networks in time and space. 
By paying attention to people’s social connections and their 
mobility, we aim to better understand how dynamic translocal 
figurations of displacement matter in their everyday lives. 
The focus of this working paper is on findings from Jordan. 
Since 2011, around one million Syrians have been displaced to 
Jordan, who have settled mainly in the northern urban areas 
(UNHCR, 2020b). The situation for these Syrians is yet to be 
decided: They are generally unable and unwilling to return 
to Syria because of danger, instability and political threats; 
unable—and, in a few instances, unwilling—to resettle in third 
countries and are granted a series of residency permits from 
the Jordanian government intended to help provide for short-
term and mid-range livelihoods in work and school, rather than 
permanent local integration and nationality. UNHCR and other 
aid organisations step in to provide some aid and protection. 
The assistance offered has significant gaps, which leaves many 
Syrians challenged to secure their livelihoods. With Syrian dis-
placement into Jordan developing into a decade-long protracted 
displacement situation, our research question above is key.
The Syrian displacement crisis is entering its tenth year. Yet  
numerous key issues are still facing this large refugee population 
of Syrians in Jordan. The Jordanian government estimates that 
over one million Syrians have settled in Jordan, which at least 
some analysts believe to be an overestimation (Baylouny, 2020). 
Over half of these estimated refugees are registered as such with 
UNHCR (approximately 650,000). Around 120,000 of the reg-
istered refugees live in camp settings (19%). The overwhelming 
majority of registered and non-registered refugees live in non-
camp settings in urban areas, with a smaller number in rural 
areas (Ledwith, 2014; UNHCR, 2020b). The two largest refugee 
camps are Zaatari and Azraq, which can house up to 100,000 
refugees at any given time each and currently operate at 60-80 
per cent capacity (UNHCR, 2020c). While much attention has 
been given to the camps, 81 per cent of the Syrian refugees in 
Jordan live in urban and semi-urban areas (UNHCR, 2020b). 
Many initially left Zaatari camp under the kafala, or “sponsor-
ship” system, which is discussed in detail in Section 3.3. To be 
allowed to leave the camp, a Syrian refugee had to provide a 
Jordanian national acting as legal guardian or sponsor (kafil). 
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The kafala system was applied to Syrian refugees but was 
gradually dismantled and finally scrapped in 2015 (Alahmed, 
2015). A small number of Syrians (approximately 34,000) have 
returned to Syria from Jordan voluntarily (Edwards & Al-Hou-
rani, 2019). 
The estimated 525,000 Syrians living in urban areas concen-
trate mainly in four governorates (Amman, 29.5%; Mafraq; 
24.8%; Irbid; 20.6%; Zarqa, 14.6%). An additional eight gover-
norates house the remaining urban refugees (UNHCR, 2020b). 
The case of Umm-Bahaa in the opening vignette captures many 
of our key findings, which we explore in detail in the paper. 
Most Syrians we interviewed found themselves in a position 
of betwixt-and-between multiple national and transnational 
locations, with competing family- and kin-based ties and live-
lihood concerns in the context of an unevenly supportive host 
community. Further, they reported uncertainty in connections 
to both family and the host community, which prompts tensions 
and strains. Syrians forge new relationships in conditions of 
precarity and inequality; long-standing relationships, they indi-
cated, may falter under the same forces.
The paper is divided into four sections:
Chapter 1 provides more detail on the empirical design of the 
study, its limitations and some background on how the data 
collection process unfolded in practice, including the challenges 
we encountered. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the displacement figurations 
in Jordan.
Chapter 3 consists of the main body of our paper, and it 
presents and analyses the empirical data in reference to the five 
main themes of TRAFIG: 
Section 3.1 looks at the first TRAFIG theme, “Navigating 
through governance regimes of aid and asylum” as they apply in 
Jordan, and ways in which displaced Syrians in Jordan navigate 
these regimes, both to seek safety and protection and for their 
daily survival. 
Section 3.2 investigates the second TRAFIG theme, “Living in 
Limbo,” and explores Syrians’ lives under uncertain futures; 
how they sustain their livelihoods and also to what extent they 
are able and aspire to escape from these conditions with their 
social networks. 
Section 3.3 discusses Theme 3, “Following the Networks” and 
looks into ways in which Syrians’ connections help them to be 
mobile: to move out of refugee camps in Jordan and into and 
within urban areas, and imagine the prospects for returning to 
Syria or going “elsewhere.” 
Section 3.4 examines Theme 4, “Building alliances,” and looks 
into how Syrians in Jordan build alliances and become “de 
facto” locally integrated. Because local integration is highly 
relational, we look into the relations between displaced Syrians 
and the Jordanian host communities under this theme. 
Section 3.5 looks at the fifth theme of TRAFIG, “Seizing Op-
portunities.” It explores the economic opportunities and impact 
of Syrians in the Jordanian context. 
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of some cross-cutting findings 
and other emerging themes that came out of our research. 
The Conclusions give a short summary of our main findings 
concerning the translocal figuration of Syrian displacement in 
Jordan and implications for the research.
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This working paper draws partly from a report that was written 
at the end of the qualitative field research (Tobin et al., 2020) and 
is based on empirical findings from data collected from Syrian 
refugees in Jordan. In this chapter, we provide more detail on the 
research team, the selection of research sites, sampling, plan-
ning, our approach to data analysis and the challenges we faced 
during the study. The paper relies on qualitative data primarily 
with support from our quantitative data. (For an overview of the 
different methods that have been used, see p. 8.)
1.1	Research	team	and	location
The Jordan research team is led by Drs Sarah A Tobin (Chr. 
Michelsen Institute–CMI), Are John Knudsen (CMI), Fawwaz 
A. (Momani, Yarmouk University–YU), Rasheed Al-Jarrah 
(YU) and Tamara Al Yakoub (YU). The field researchers are 
all based out of Yarmouk University and include Dr Tamara Al 
Yakoub, Dr Rasha Jadaan Husban, Ahmad Ghanem Shdefat, 
Wurud Abdelrazak Alawad, Khalid Hassan Momani and Rola 
Fares Saleem AlMassad.
We selected three field sites for our research in Jordan. The field 
sites include the two largest urban and semi-urban areas for 
Syrian refugees, northern Jordan (Irbid, Mafraq) and Zaatari, 
Jordan’s largest refugee camp for Syrians.
The greater Irbid area is the first research site. Before the influx 
of Syrian refugees, Irbid city was the second-largest urban area 
in the country (after the capital city of Amman) and was well-
known for its high population density and a large number of in-
stitutions for higher education (UNHCR, 2016). In 2016, about 
30 per cent of the country’s urban Syrian refugees lived in the 
greater Irbid area (Tiltnes, Zhang, & Pederson, 2019; UNHCR, 
2016), including the semi-urban area of Ajloun, where we also 
conducted research. 
In the greater Mafraq area, the second field site, the city of  
Mafraq is approximately 15 km from the Syrian border (Back-
haus, 2019). Pre-Syrian crisis, Mafraq city was a small border 
town of 90,000 people that one could stop in while en-route to 
the Syrian border and onwards to Damascus or beyond. Mafraq 
was one of the earliest sites for Syrian refugees to congregate 
in Jordan, given its proximity to southern Syria, where the anti- 
Assad regime demonstrations were quickly and violently re-
pressed. The greater Mafraq area, including the city of Ramtha, 
where we also conducted research, is now home to over 200,000 
people, many or most of whom are Syrians, and the area is known 
for its high population density (Tiltnes, Zhang & Pederson, 2019). 
In the Mafraq area, the average annual income for Syrians is 
approximately 30 per cent lower than in Irbid at 2,100 Jordanian 
dinars (JOD) (US $3,000) (ibid.). Mafraq governate is consid-
ered the poorest in the country (Al Sharafat, 2019). 
The last field site is Zaatari camp, which is about 15 km from 
Mafraq city and shares the Mafraq governorate’s challenges of 
poverty and out-of-camp work opportunities. The camp opened 
in 2012. It was once home to about 100,000 people (Sullivan 
& Tobin, 2014) but now has about 76,500 residents (UNHCR, 
2020c). This makes the refugee camp one of the largest in the 
world and the fourth-largest “city” in Jordan. Most Zaatari 
refugees are from the nearby southern Syrian region of Dara(a) 
(Ar. Dar‘a), where the Syrian uprising began in 2011. Beyond 
the sheer number of people, more than 80 per cent of Zaatari 
residents could be classified as “vulnerable:” More than 50 per 
cent of camp residents are children (boys and girls under 17), 
and 25 per cent are adult women; up to 15 babies are born each 
day in the camp, and 30 per cent are female-headed households 
(Sullivan & Tobin, 2014; UNHCR 2020f). Combined with the 
governorate’s greater challenges of poverty and lack of work 
opportunities, residents of Zaatari experience marginalisation 
at multiple and compounded levels. The camp is run jointly by 
UNHCR and the Jordanian government, with a large number of 
international and national NGOs assisting.
Robert Forster, a PhD student at the University of Bergen, 
Norway, conducted research for this project in Tripoli, Lebanon, 
in February and March 2020 before the COVID-19 lockdowns. 
The data collected include qualitative interviews of 15 house-
holds in the neighbourhoods of al-Qubbeh and Abu Samra. 
These are peripheral suburban and semi-urban neighbourhoods 
that have large Syrian populations of up to 70 per cent. Gender 
distribution was four women and eleven men, most between 30 
and 40 and married with children. Having family connections 
in Jordan was a criterion for selection to analyse larger impacts 
of transnational figurations. The interviews focused on Theme 3 
“Following the Networks”. The data from this extension of the 
Jordan study is currently being analysed through a theoretical 
and empirical framework on “the economy of favours,” an 
informal social contract invoked among Syrians in Tripoli, with 
interesting implications for transnational figurations. The paper 
will be available later in 2021.
1.	Empirical	design	and	limitations	of	the	study		
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before each research encounter. Some of the interviews were 
audio-recorded. However, the Syrian respondents were over-
whelmingly reluctant to agree to video recording, which is  
attributable to the security concerns discussed later in this paper. 
Research participants’ profiles
According to UNHCR (2020b), most Syrian refugees in Jordan 
(nearly 50%) are between 18 and 59 years old. One-third are 
children under the age of 11. The remainder are teens between 
ages 12 and 17 (14%), and those over age 60 (4%). There are 
slightly more males than females (50.6%:49.4%). Nearly half of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan originate from Daraa (Tiltnes, Zhang, 
& Pedersen, 2019). The other major Syrian governorates of origin 
are Homs (19%), Aleppo (10%), rural Damascus (9%) and 
Damascus (8%) (ibid.). Half have started or completed primary 
education, and 15 per cent of adults older than 20 have achieved 
a secondary or post-secondary degree (ibid.). Most live outside 
camps (81%; UNHCR,2020b).
1.2	Sampling	and	data	collection
Data were collected over 18 months during 2019/2020. The 
researchers employed snowball sampling to collect the data 
in the selected field sites (see figure on p. 8). They began by 
completing semi-structured interviews first, followed by bio-
graphic/life histories and participatory methods, then by focus 
groups. The quantitative survey was the last method employed, 
though it was completed before the participatory methods and 
focus group discussions due to COVID-19 prevention restrictions. 
Each researcher focussed on one of the different TRAFIG 
themes, except for the sole researcher responsible for field site 
number three (Zaatari camp), who collected data on all themes 
concurrently. The researchers organised a WhatsApp group 
to share connections, overlaps and common themes, and the 
team in Jordan met regularly to discuss these as well (within the 
guidelines of COVID-19 restrictions on gatherings, discussed 
below). Informed consent was obtained from participants 
Figure	1:	Demographic	breakdown	of	TRAFIG	respondents	
Figure	2:	Demographic	breakdown	of	TRAFIG	respondents	in	semi-structured	interviews
Source: TRAFIG survey data, n=305; Note: in per cent; *Other: rural Damascus, Idlib, Hamah, Quneitra, Raqqah
Source: TRAFIG data, n=100; Note: in per cent;*Other: rural Damascus, Idlib, Hamah, Quneitra, Raqqah
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Similarly to the Syrians in Jordan more generally, 80 per cent of 
the TRAFIG survey respondents live outside Zaatari camp, and 
20 per cent live inside. 
With our quantitative survey, we are able to see that most of 
our respondents are registered with the national Jordanian 
government (85%) and UNHCR (76%). Most have only applied 
for asylum or another protection status in Jordan (90.1%). 
Half of our quantitative survey respondents reported that their 
economic situation in Jordan is “much worse” than it was in 
Syria (50.2%). These important trends are discussed in detail 
throughout this working paper. 
Our research participants generally reflect the larger demo-
graphic trends of Syrians in Jordan, but not perfectly. (For the 
demographic breakdown of our TRAFIG respondents, see 
Figures 1 and 2.)
1.3	Fieldwork	challenges
There have been two key challenges to the study. First, the 
field researchers raised the issue that many of our Syrian 
interviewees were unwilling to provide detailed personal 
information because of security concerns. For example, many 
Syrians were vague about the locations of family members 
or close friends, indicating that they were “in Jordan” only. 
The researchers worked hard to build a good rapport with 
interviewees to alleviate the concerns as necessary. We do not 
believe our data are inaccurate or missing key information, 
though elaboration of locations of family members and close 
friends would have been useful in the sampling for additional 
interviews and in our figurational analyses. More importantly, 
though, security concerns, which are discussed throughout the 
paper, played important roles in the mobility and vulnerability 
experienced by Syrians.
Second, COVID-19 prevention restrictions meant that our 
researchers had a difficult time completing the focus groups 
discussions. This was because of the limitations on and restric-
tions against gatherings of more than four or five people from 
different households proscribed by the Jordanian government. 
The researchers responded by conducting focus group discus-
sions with extended family units rather than a mix of unrelated 
Syrians. This also facilitated further, in-depth discussions 
within the family revealing important social and cultural forms 
of support, challenges and decisions regarding mobility. 
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Beyond Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians, Jordan has also 
demonstrated hospitality to thousands of Yemenis, Sudanese, 
Somalis and Libyans who have sought asylum in Jordan to 
escape instability and violence in their respective countries 
(Davis et al, 2016).
Jordan is neither party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention 
nor to the 1967 Protocol. The country does not have specific 
domestic legislation targeting refugees but instead offers 
protection and asylum to political refugees and UN-approved 
foreigners (Ferreira, 2020; Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs 
Department, 1973). The legal framework governing the 
treatment of refugees in Jordan is the 1998 Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between Jordan and UNHCR (Saliba, 
2016). This memorandum obligates the Jordanian government 
to provide protection and assistance to refugees and asylum 
seekers, giving them the right to reside for six months or until a 
lasting solution to their problems is found (UNHCR, 2015). The 
implementation of refugee policies in Jordan relies heavily on 
the interventions of UNHCR through which registered refugees 
are entitled to humanitarian relief. In collaboration with the 
Jordanian government, UNHCR issued a protection document 
that provides legal safeguards and prevents detention practices 
for refugees on Jordanian soil. Refugees must obtain proof of 
residence in Jordan. Jordan also signed the Anti-Trafficking Act 
in 2009.
From the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Syrians entered 
Jordan through a mix of formal and informal border crossings. 
Syrian refugees who entered regularly (legally) were required 
to present their Syrian passports at a regular port of entry 
(formal crossing) under the legal regulations in existence before 
the Syrian crisis (Norwegian Research Council, 2018). Those 
who entered irregularly (illegally), if found by the Jordanian 
officials, were transported to a refugee camp for registration 
and processing. Most of the refugees crossed the border at 
informal entry points near Daraa (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
In September 2012, one of the major informal crossings was 
closed, and by mid-2013, Jordan closed all the informal border 
crossings, except to those who required medical care. The main 
formal crossing in this area, the Jaber–Nassib border crossing, 
closed in mid-2015. By 2016, all border crossings—both formal 
and informal—had been shut down, and Syrians wanting to 
enter Jordan were required to obtain a visa prior to arrival.
With the establishment of Israel in 1948, around 700,000 
Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes in 
the area, becoming recognised as Palestinian refugees through 
what is known as the 1948 Palestinian exodus, or “catastrophe” 
(Ar. nakba). Many of them crossed Jordan’s western border 
into, what had by then become established as The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. The conflict between the Israelis and the 
Arabs erupted again in 1967, generating a new wave of Pales-
tinian refugees to flee or be expelled from their homes. In both 
cases, Jordan had the lion’s share of Palestinians fleeing the 
wars (Kumaraswamy et al., 2019; Nuwar, 2006; Dana, 2000). 
On Jordan’s eastern border, the Gulf War erupted in 1991 after 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, causing a new wave of in-
coming Palestinians. According to estimates, “Palestinians were 
the second largest group uprooted by the Gulf war, and around 
300,000 resettled in Jordan” (Galbraith, 2003). The United 
States led a new war on Iraq in March 2003. The toppling of 
Saddam Hussein caused sectarian violence, thus driving Iraqis 
to flee to neighbouring countries, including Jordan. The intensi-
fication of the civil war in Iraq and the rise of terrorist organisa-
tions’ activities in the country increased the number of people 
fleeing. Jordan accepted the largest portions (Kumaraswamy et 
al., 2019; Nuwar, 2006; Dana, 2000). 
On Jordan’s northern border, the Arab Spring started in Syria 
in March 2011. In the following months, anti-government 
demonstrations began in Daraa, the first Syrian city to witness 
protest against Assad’s regime, before they spread to major 
cities such as Aleppo and the capital Damascus (Leenders & 
Heydemann, 2012). As regional and international mediation 
efforts, short-lived truces and UN-observer missions failed, the 
conflict escalated into a full-fledged civil war in mid-2012. The 
turning point was the Syrian Army’s ground assault on Homs in 
March 2012 (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The first major dis-
placements in the north were recorded in June 2012, when about 
150,000 villagers fled two Sunni villages in the Idlib governate, 
fearing retaliation by the Syrian Army. In mid-August, the first 
Palestinian refugees were displaced, when 10,000 fled the army’s 
shelling of the al-Ramel camp in Latakia. From the start of 
2013, nearly 50,000 people were fleeing Syria every week. By 
mid-2013, the UN casualty figure was more than 100,000 dead; 
estimates for 2015 reached 240,000. The Syrian crisis led to 
large scale displacement to neighbouring countries, with Jordan 
a major destination for Syrian refugees. 
2.	Protracted	displacement	in	Jordan	
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While only a few of our respondents arrived in Jordan in 2011 
(3%), the majority came in 2012 (31%) and 2013 (50%). In 
subsequent years the number of arrivals dropped sharply, con-
sistent with the overall trends among Syrians in Jordan, where 
the largest portion (41.4%) arrived in 2013 (UNHCR, 2020b). 
In our interviews and surveys, we did not inquire whether the 
respondents had entered Jordan regularly or irregularly; thus 
we do not know how many of our respondents fell into each 
category. However, many of those we interviewed volunteered 
such information, which was not considered particularly 
sensitive. This is because, in March 2018, the Jordanian gov-
ernment and UNHCR launched a comprehensive campaign 
to regularise all Syrians within the country’s borders (Human 
Rights Watch, 2018). The “amnesty” was extended to those 
who had entered Jordan irregularly (illegally) and those who 
had left refugee camps without obtaining the required permis-
sions. The regularisation of Syrian refugees gave upwards of 
50,000 refugees access to UNHCR aid and assistance, access 
to education for children, as well as legal residency in Jordan 
(Human Rights Watch, 2018). Before refugees were offered 
amnesty, Syrians caught without proper documentation (i.e. a 
UNHCR registration card) were subject to arrest, involuntary 
settlement in a refugee camp and deportation to Syria. The 
regularisation programme was considered a major step towards 
protecting Syrians in Jordan, reducing stigma, ensuring safety 
and security for Syrians outside their homes and improving the 
relations between host communities and Syrian refugees (Nor-
wegian Research Council, 2018). The positive impact of the 
regularisation campaign was evident in the response from our 
respondents: 98 per cent of the total sample are registered with 
municipal authorities and 76 per cent with UNHCR. 
From the start of their displacement to Jordan, Syrians’ general 
movement was either out of or avoiding refugee camps and into 
the urban and peri-urban areas. As mentioned above, less than  
20 per cent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan live in camps 
(UNHCR, 2019a). The shift towards urban and peri-urban areas 
led to localised overcrowding, cramped living conditions and 
strained the local infrastructure that was inadequate to cope with 
the influx of new residents (Tiltnes, Zhang, & Pederson, 2019). 
As a country with one of the smallest economies in the Middle 
East and without international assistance, Jordan struggled 
to care for all refugees’ immediate needs. The lack of natural 
resources and the repeated influx of regional refugees have 
strained national infrastructure and, at least according to 
some analysts, hampered the economic growth of the country 
(Achilli, 2015). The impact of Syrian refugees on the labour 
market is contested (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2016; Fallah, Krafft, & 
Wahba, 2019), but some studies indicate an increase in the com-
petition for scarce jobs, especially in the informal sector (Fakih 
& Ibrahim, 2016). As one of the world’s poorest countries in 
terms of water resources (Hadadin et al., 2010), Jordan was not 
well-positioned to cater for the numerous refugees (Baylouny & 
Klingseis, 2018; Farishta, 2014). The influx of Syrian refugees 
has enabled Jordan to access international aid for its national 
economy as a “refugee rentier state” (Tsourapas, 2019).
An important policy instrument for managing the influx of 
Syrian refugees is the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), a multi-year 
framework for steering and coordinating the aid response to 
Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians (Ministry of Plan-
ning and International Cooperation, 2017). UNHCR coordi-
nates the refugee response under the leadership of the gov-
ernment of Jordan, in a collaborative effort between the donor 
Figure	3:	Year	of	arrival	to	Jordan	by	survey	respondents
Source: UNHCR, 2000; TRAFIG survey data, n=303; Note: share in per cent
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community, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, 
community-based organisations (CBOs), refugees and host 
communities (UNHCR, 2019b). Currently, eight sectors provide 
support within the Jordan refugee response, where UNHCR 
co-chairs several sectors and their thematic working groups. 
UNHCR also supports the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate 
(SRAD), the Jordanian governmental agency that manages and 
coordinates assistance to Syrian refugees. UNHCR has also 
implemented a self-renewal method for refugee registration 
procedures. It is the first operation globally where “persons of 
concern” are able to register, renew and access personal data on 
their own (UNHCR, 2019b).  
As for refugees’ employment in the local labour market, the  
Jordanian Ministry of Labour has issued work permits for Syrian 
refugees to work in some professions. In 2016, the government of 
Jordan and the international community signed the Jordan Com-
pact, an agreement combining labour market access for refuges 
with favourable terms of trade with the European Union (Tobin 
& Alahmed, 2019). The agreement is financed by the World Bank 
and the European Union, and aid disbursement (US $300 million) 
is measured against implementing 200,000 work permits for 
Syrian refugees. The agreement reflects an increased emphasis at 
the international level on supporting development opportunities in 
refugee–host country states as a “win-win” solution in protracted 
crises (Betts & Collier 2017). (For a critical reflection on the 
Jordan Compact, see Grawert, 2019.)
The agreement legalises the refugees’ access to certain formal 
work with the aims of enhancing self-reliance, reducing onward 
migration and protecting refugees from exploitation (Tobin & 
Alahmed, 2019). Syrians can now apply for work in specific open 
sectors and low-skilled professions approved for foreign workers, 
including agriculture, construction, textiles/garment manufac-
turing and food service. The Ministry of Labour exempted the Syr-
ians from the work permit fees; they only pay a symbolic admin-
istrative fee of 10 JOD (US $14) (UNHCR, 2019a). Of the almost 
160,000 work permits issued to date, only one-fourth are believed 
to be in active use (Durable Solutions Platform, 2020). Work per-
mits and employment are discussed in detail in Section 3.5.
Jordan has been working with the international community 
to provide public services, including housing, schooling, and 
medical care to the refugees. Although refugees have access to 
basic public services, some of which are foreseen in the Jordan 
Response Plan, the Jordanian government continues to experi-
ence difficulties maintaining these services and affording better 
ones. This is discussed further in the next chapter.
These patchwork approaches are a general problem in pro-
tracted refugee situations, which are often characterised by 
such ad-hoc policy instruments, temporary adjustments to 
labour market access and domestic attempts to smooth over a 
potentially disruptive demographic shift hoping that a durable 
solution will be realised soon, which it most often is not. 
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refugees are eligible for rental support and winterisation kits 
(SSInt-YU-RH-003-JOR, SSInt-YU-RH-004-JOR). In-kind aid 
or food stamps/food coupons are often not considered when ref-
erencing “aid” in interviews, reflecting that “aid” has become 
synonymous with “cash-in-hand” payments to refugees.
Registering as a refugee grants access to primary and secondary 
schooling in public schools as well as basic health services in 
government clinics and hospitals. Those who live in official, 
UNHCR-sponsored refugee camps are also entitled to housing, 
electricity and water. Syrian refugees are entitled to work per-
mits under the Jordan Compact, as mentioned above (Tobin & 
Alahmed, 2019; Grawert, 2019). In addition to formal support 
from UNHCR, refugees can access a range of specialised 
needs-based services and grants offered by INGOs and NGOs 
related to health, medical aid, psycho-social counseling as well 
as legal aid. These are important additions to aiding refugees 
but often offered only to the most vulnerable. 
To receive benefits, refugees must know of their existence (in-
formation), be able to access them (accessibility) and be eligible 
for support (eligibility). Our interviews point to all three as 
inadequate: Syrian refugees may lack accurate information, 
cannot access the service provider and/or are not eligible for 
support. 
Families typically reported pooling benefits from several 
sources to remain viable (SSInt-YU-RH-004-JOR): “We’ve 
received rental support from one organisation for six months. 
Another helped me in receiving physical therapy. A third one 
helped me financially (…) as did UNHCR.” Even then, some 
of those interviewed indicated that they lack sufficient aid for 
basic needs and suffer from food insecurity: “I am not satisfied 
with it [the support I get] because the food aid [coupons] is 
not sufficient, and does not meet our basic needs. I swear to 
God that there are many days I leave food on the table, just to 
let my children have enough to eat” (SSInt-YU-RH-011-JOR). 
Interviewees from areas outside of Mafraq and Zaatari camp 
especially complained about the lack of aid assistance to them 
and even its retraction (e.g FGD-YU-RF-001-JOR; BInt-YU-
TA-001-JO)
As shown in Table 1, the respondents received a range of support 
over the past year from sources other than UNHCR, with about 
two-thirds having received some form of aid, with food aid and 
medical and health care the most common (60%; 53%), followed 
by cash transfers and in kind-support to about one-third of 
respondents. The results indicate that many are unaided, and 
support systems are insufficient to provide for their needs.
This chapter addresses the main questions of TRAFIG by  
analysing its five main themes. 
3.1	Navigating	through	governance	regimes	
of	aid	and	asylum
This section looks into Theme 1 of TRAFIG: “Navigating 
through governance regimes of aid and asylum.” The main 
question this section aims to address is: How do displaced 
people gain access to, make use of and are governed by policies 
and programs in the fields of humanitarian aid, development, 
and protection? We first explore the various aid regimes that 
exist in Jordan. We then examine the sourcing of knowledge 
of aid regimes, focussing on health care and education. We 
conclude with a discussion about insecurity and concerns about 
surveillance. In particular, this section argues that navigating 
aid regimes requires information, accessibility and eligibility, 
which Syrians struggle to attain.
Aid regimes
Syrian refugees are highly vulnerable and differ from the Jor-
danian host population: They are younger, have more depend-
ents, less formal education and are more often from rural areas 
(Higher Population Council, 2018). Syrians in Jordan live in 
precarious circumstances, where at least 70 per cent are below 
the poverty line (Verme et al., 2016). Current aid modalities 
and systems such as the Syrian Regional Refugee & Resilience 
Plan (3RP) are underfunded and face coordination gaps (World 
Bank, 2017). Despite cash and in-kind assistance to more than 
two-thirds of the Syrian refugees, nine out of ten are food inse-
cure, with cash expenditures reduced amidst rising house rents 
(Majewski et al., 2018). The limitations of formal support mech-
anisms, being too small and inadequate, reflect larger studies 
confirming the increasing poverty and vulnerability of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan (Verme et al., 2016). Such programmes are 
not sustainable in the long run (ibid.), and there is growing con-
sensus that international aid should be reoriented and strategi-
cally employed to expand job creation, income-generation and 
self-sufficiency. This holds particularly for easing restrictions 
on camp-based populations that are largely dependent on aid 
(Lenner & Turner, 2019).  
Registering as a refugee with UNHCR is the most common way 
to access aid. It entitles refugees to receive cash support from 
UNHCR and support from the World Food Programme (WFP) 
(Majewski et al., 2018). The cash-aid benefit varies depending 
on family size and aims to supply 80 per cent of a family’s 
needs. A typical cash-aid benefit for a family of four (two adults 
and two children) is 125 JOD per month (US $176). Urban 
3.	Key	dimensions	of	figurations	of	displacement	in	Jordan	
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RH-002-JOR). Typically, the respondents access health services 
from a range of providers, especially if needing specialist care, 
as shown in this quote from an interview from a woman using: 
“government hospitals, such as the [name of hospital], as well 
as the gynaecology and obstetrics [ward] in Mafraq and [hos-
pital] at the expense of UNHCR. Sometimes we get the treat-
ment [covered] by the Chamber of Commerce, but I must buy 
the medicine on my own” (SsInt-YU-ahmad-004-JOR).  
In Jordan, school-age enrollment is 56 per cent for Syrian 
refugees but 90 per cent for Jordanian nationals (UNHCR & 
World Bank, 2019). This means that almost half of the Syrian 
school-aged cohort is not attending formal education. Further, 
adults’ and parents’ educational levels are also low: Only about 
half (53.7%) of our survey respondents had completed primary 
education, and about one-third (28.7%) had not attended school 
at all or did not complete primary education. The inability to 
access or complete education is likely due to displacement 
disrupting their education in Syria, then being unable to resume 
their schooling in Jordan due to care duties for family members 
(SsInt-YU-RH-006-JOR). Remedial classes and back-to-school 
options exist but are limited (SSInt-YU-RH-002-JOR). A few 
men have special marketable skills (e.g. language skills), while 
others have been able to pass entry exams to Jordan’s uni-
versities and are now studying medicine and pharmacy, both 
high-status professions with strict entry requirements (SsInt-
YU-WA-004-JOR). 
All the families interviewed who had children at home were 
concerned with the quality of education. In Jordan, Syrian 
refugees can access private schools that charge a tuition fee and 
public schools that are free of cost. The latter are crowded with 
two shifts, a morning shift for Jordanians and an afternoon shift 
for Syrians. Private schools may provide additional services 
such as busses to school and meals for the children. Therefore, 
those who can afford it send their children to private schools 
(SsInt-YU-WA-001-JOR; SsInt-YU-WA-001-JOR; SsInt-YU-
WA-011-JOR). School enrolment reflects socio-economic 
stratification between poor rural (Daraa) and affluent urban 
(Damascus) refugees (SsInt-YU-WA-020-JOR). Some of the 
respondents stated they depend on child labour to pay family 
expenses and cannot afford to send their children to school, thus 
having to resort to what is termed “negative coping mecha-
nisms” (Gustavsson, 2015). Others are considering returning 
to Syria to help their children access secondary schooling 
there. Some also send children to Islamic schools (SSInt-YU-
RH-002-JOR). About seven out of ten (71.9%) of our survey 
respondents had members of their households currently en-
rolled in educational activities in Jordan. Interestingly, of those 
enrolled in educational activities in Jordan, the majority (67%) 
live in Zaatari camp. This underscores the need to address the 
distinct educational vulnerabilities that exist between in-camp 
and out-of-camp refugees.
Sourcing aid: Information, health care and education 
The most important source of information about aid is one’s 
own family, relatives and friends. One reason why information 
is sourced from family and friends is that needing help and 
support may be considered embarrassing or shameful and, 
therefore, is not disclosed outside of the immediate family. 
As one Syrian said (SSInt-YU-RH-002-JOR): “I get some 
information from my relatives and family members. I do not 
get information from friends or acquaintances because I do 
not mix much with people.” Facebook and social media have 
become important sources of information for refugees but are 
still not universally used or accessed. “I had no idea that there 
are WhatsApp groups and Facebook posts that provide infor-
mation about aid” (SSInt-YU-RH-011-JOR). Aid agencies use 
digital and social media such as WhatsApp and SMS messages 
to disseminate information and contact refugees directly. They 
also post information in user groups for Syrian refugees (Tobin 
& Alahmed, 2019). 
The respondents can access a range of free or low-cost health 
services, both governmental and international. The quantitative 
study found that 84.1 per cent of respondents had access to a 
hospital or other health services the last time they needed it. 
Of those who did not have access to a hospital or other health 
service the last time they needed it, 100 per cent were outside of 
Zaatari. International organisations provided for 22.4 per cent 
of services, state-run facilities accounted for 20 per cent, and 
national NGOs for 11.2 per cent. The figures testify to the im-
portance of INGO/NGOs in complementing the government’s 
health provision, especially for those living outside of camps.
Not every medical expense is covered, and costs for some 
diagnostics and treatments are high. For example, laboratory 
tests and medicine must be paid in full, and most need financial 
support from several NGOs to do so. One respondent, a mid-
dle-aged woman, receives financial assistance from interna-
tional NGOs, yet struggles to pay for her costly lab test: “I have 
a kidney problem, and therefore I need to have frequent med-
ical tests that cost 30-40 JOD. The [name of INGO] help me 
pay for the medicine and my monthly medical tests” (SsInt-YU-
Type of support in %
Support received (from any source) 63
Food aid and vouchers (INGOs) 60
Medical and health care 53
Cash transfers (INGOs) 37
Other (skills training, courses) 30
In-kind support 28
Shelter and accommodation 17
Table	1:	Support	from	government,	INGOs	and	NGOs		
during	the	past	12	months	
Source: TRAFIG survey data, n=305
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Concluding	remarks
The large majority of our respondents are registered with 
UNHCR, which entitles them to access to a range of general 
and specialised forms of aid, including cash-aid from UNHCR, 
some state services (health and education) and (I)NGO-sector 
support. There are still many protection gaps since accessing 
support requires information, accessibility and eligibility. 
Many of these aid provisions either reach too few or are inade-
quate for their needs. The refugees seek out support from local 
and international sources and combine aid and resources from 
several sources to remain viable yet experience gradual impov-
erishment. Widespread unemployment and underemployment 
coincide with a dependency on humanitarian aid. Education 
options are undersupplied and underutilised. Camp-based 
refugees especially suffer from insecurity.
Only about one in ten survey respondents have completed 
tertiary education at university, college, or polytechnics. It is 
challenging for Syrians to attain a tertiary education in Jordan 
because public universities are prohibitively expensive. Syrians 
are charged an international student rate rather than the cheaper 
Jordanian national rate. Moreover, Syrians have to pay the 
tuition fees in one lump sum. This is why Jordanian public uni-
versities are out of reach for most Syrians unless an NGO helps 
them to pay their tuition. In rare instances, students have been 
able to pursue university education on a scholarship (SsInt-YU-
WA-007-JOR). These instances are atypical.
Insecurity and surveillance 
The respondents in this study, especially those in Zaatari camp, 
describe conditions of insecurity, reflected in their relations 
with other refugees and the camp and government authorities. 
Yet, security arrangements in Jordan’s refugee camps are strict 
(Hoffmann, 2017). In the words of one Zaatari resident: 
As a refugee, you never know whether you can stay an-
other day [in Zaatari], be transferred to the Azraq camp 
or deported to Syria. Because of this, we live in constant 
fear. For no fault of our own, we can also be punished for 
a crime committed by someone else, whether a relative or 
non-relative (BInt-YU-ahmad-003-JOR) .
Other interviewees confirmed the feeling of insecurity (e.g. 
SsInt-YU-ahmad-010-JOR). Some were unwilling to answer 
questions about the information they receive from others or 
share with others, or whether they have applied for asylum or 
details of their refugee status (SsInt-YU-ahmad-004-JOR). One 
respondent threatened to withdraw from the interview if re-
quired to answer questions related to his contact with national, 
international and UN agencies, personal contacts and sources 
(SsInt-YU-ahmad-001-JOR). This indicates that camp residents 
in particular are reticent about disclosing information that could 
jeopardise their refugee status or come under the scrutiny of 
authorities or security agencies. While it is not possible to in-
dependently verify the level of surveillance in camps, refugees’ 
deportation and detention have been documented in Jordan even 
though this violates the non-refoulment principle in Jordan’s 
agreement with UNHCR (Molnar, 2020). Involuntary returns as 
a governance strategy are discussed below in Section 3.3.
Key findings
•	 Humanitarian aid is not sufficient to offset widespread 
poverty.
•	 Basic health services are free or low-cost, yet insuffi-
cient without NGO-sector support.
•	 Refugees often struggle with obtaining sufficient infor-
mation, access and being eligible for aid.
•	 Access to quality schooling is a major concern, and 
school uptake is low. 
•	 Syrian refugees, especially those in Zaatari, suffer from 
insecurity and fear of being detained or deported.
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3.2	Living	in	limbo:	Livelihoods,	(in)security	
and	precarity	in	local	settings	
This section looks into Theme 2 of TRAFIG: “Living in Limbo: 
Livelihoods, (in)security, and precarity in local settings.” The 
main question this chapter aims to address is: “Why and how 
do displaced people live in situations of ‘limbo?’ How do they 
sustain their livelihoods in Jordan? “Living in limbo” could 
be defined as life courses and livelihoods that are difficult to 
change or improve for structural and systemic reasons that stem 
from conditions of protracted displacement. Syrians face many 
difficulties as refugees in Jordan. 
Shelter and social protection: Camp and non-camp
While some Syrians moved directly to urban areas when they 
arrived in Jordan, others stayed in refugee camps for shorter 
or longer periods before resettling in urban centres (SsInt-
YU-WA-003-JOR). For many, the camps were only temporary 
measures in the early phase of displacement, with families 
leaving voluntarily for urban areas and cities, mainly Irbid and 
Mafraq, when conditions allowed and regulations permitted. A 
few of the families and young couples in the sample continue to 
live in camps and urban areas (SsInt-YU-WA-006-JOR), with 
dual residence reflecting familial strategies and new unions after 
being displaced (SsInt-YU-ahmad-007-JOR). Those who remain 
in the camps are offered benefits, including housing, water 
and electricity (AlHamoud 2015). However, Jordan’s Syrian 
refugee camps are associated with lower social status and poorer 
conditions as well as high levels of surveillance, which can help 
explain why many leave and move to urban areas. 
Living in refugee camps may mean greater aid benefits but 
fewer opportunities and having to endure living conditions with 
limited individual freedoms that many find stressful. In Zaatari, 
tribal councils have been set up to mediate relations between 
refugees and camp authorities (SsInt-YU-ahmad-011-JOR; 
Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). Refugees in Zaatari live in “caravans,” 
which are mobile homes. Residents complain of the unfair 
distribution of caravans and the residents’ inability to repair 
and improve living quarters due to favouritism and corruption 
and needing help from gatekeepers to access them (ibid.). Two 
of the biggest problems for camp-based refugees in Zaatari are 
the strict security measures and chronic uncertainty. These are 
some of the reasons why some (12 per cent of Zaatari respond-
ents according to our survey) do not see a future for themselves 
in Jordan and contemplate returning to Syria. 
Connections and social networks
Social networks are strongly correlated with employment and 
well-being, and more generally, integration outcomes. Displace-
ment impacts social relations and social organisation, dividing 
extended families and increasing family fragmentation. A 
recent case study of social networks among displaced Syrians in 
Irbid found that social networks have collapsed (Stevens, 2016).
Our data show that, overall, social networks have not collapsed 
but have developed important local, translocal, and transna-
tional characteristics. Most of our survey respondents (73.9%) 
reported that between four and eight persons live in their house-
hold. Locally, most regularly spend their time with a family 
member (60.7%), while less than one-third spend time with per-
sons from their home community (31.4%). Of course, families 
are separated translocally and transnationally in displacement: 
71.0 per cent of respondents reported being separated from a 
very important family member, especially siblings (32.7%). 
We find significant differences between our camp-based and 
non-camp survey respondents on this point. Our non-camp-
based respondents are far better connected than those in 
Zaatari: 73 per cent of non-camp-based respondents indicated 
that they have translocal and transnational networks. In com-
parison, only 26 per cent of camp-based respondents (N=58) 
indicated the same. Figure 4 depicts the differences between 
out-of-camp and in-camp networks when it comes to having 
very important persons that live in other places.
Figure 5 below demonstrates the contours and differences 
between in-camp and out-of-camp translocal and transnational 
networks. While the lion’s share of survey respondents who are 
not connected beyond their place of living are found in Zaatari, 
the better part of respondents who are connected transnation-
ally can be found outside of camps. In fact, those outside the 
camp are mostly connected transnationally. We will explore the 
implications for these differing connections in the next section.
Figure	4:	Connections	beyond	place	of	living
Source: TRAFIG survey data, n=303 (243 respondents living out-of-camps, 
58 inside Zaatari camp)
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Additionally, according to our respondents' information, 
divorce rates have increased both before leaving Syria and after 
settling in Jordan. This could reflect a slight sample bias to-
wards female respondents (54.5% of sample). It may also reflect 
that the Syrian crisis and ensuing displacement has strained 
marriages and family- and kin networks. Additional research is 
needed to clarify this point. 
The quantitative survey finds that the highest number of 
respondents reporting transnational connections are widowed 
(86%) and separated or divorced (75%). In comparison, 65 per 
cent of married respondents and 39 per cent of single/never 
married respondents reported having transnational connec-
tions. One possible explanation is that when marriages end 
due to separation, divorce or death, the spouse invests in or 
grows transnational connections in response. However, further 
research would be necessary to confirm this hypothesis.
In addition to the often-reported associations of men with secu-
rity concerns, many of the women expressed feeling vulnerable 
when leaving the house. They believed and told us that the 
challenges they experienced were due to the lack of personal 
and social connections, as well as financial resources. This indi-
cates that divorce may increase families’ vulnerabilities in their 
immediate vicinity, even more so with female-headed refugee 
households (BInt-YU-WA-005-JOR; cf. McNatt et al., 2018). 
Concluding	remarks
Social networks and connections are vital for living in and 
through precarity in protracted displacement. Such connections 
influence residential practices, but not entirely. Camp-based 
refugees face distinctive hardships under more surveillance 
and insecurity than urban refugees but have more access to aid 
providers. Urban refugees are self-settled but suffer from gaps 
in aid provision. In-camp respondents are far less likely to be 
connected outside of their place of living, while out-of-camp 
respondents are most likely to have transnational connections 
out of Jordan. Remittances are important for some families with 
family members abroad, and emotional support even more so. 
These conditions add stress on families and couples, which may 
lead to family division and divorce. 
Despite the physical separation and differences in connection 
types, overall one-fifth receive financial support from the 
important family member (20.1%), and more than half receive 
emotional support (68.6%). This demonstrates that connections 
of all kinds are vital for social networks.
Family disunity and divorce 
Family and household arrangements that do not protect privacy 
or may compromise gender dynamics, often forced by the 
poverty of displacement, can cause friction and rupture. As one 
interviewee, a middle-aged woman with four sons, said: 
Initially, we stayed in my brother’s house for a week, but 
you know how life with brothers and sisters is like. (...). You 
know my sons are grown-ups. My brother’s wife was almost 
the same age as my sons. I looked for a house to live in, but 
I couldn’t find one. So we had to live in an underground 
shelter for six months until I could move into a house. 
My brother never helped! He used to bring us some food 
packages when we first arrived, but that didn’t last for long 
(SsInt-YU-RF-002-JOR).
While the majority of respondents in the interview sample are 
married (71%), there are several examples of divorce: Some 
were divorced before leaving Syria, and others divorced after 
arriving in Jordan as the husband marries again, leaving ex-
wives destitute. Some husbands left Jordan preventing ex-wives 
from reclaiming their divorce settlement (nafaqah), as told by 
this woman in her forties with four children: 
When I got divorced from my ex-husband, I immediately 
consulted the authorities to ask for the nafaqah. But 
unfortunately, the authorities made it clear to me that they 
could not help me because my husband was living abroad. 
I also tried to apply for housing for a divorced woman, 
but I could not get that either. We lived without electricity 
for two months because we could not pay the bills. I had to 
borrow some money to pay them (BInt-YU-WA-005-JOR).
Key findings
•	 Residential patterns and preferences are influenced by 
family networks and other factors.
•	 Camp-based refugees have fewer connections beyond 
their place of living.
•	 Out-of-camp refugees are more likely to have transna-
tional connections.
•	 Family units and networks are separated and vulner-
able, which can lead to family disunity and divorce.
Figure	5:	Spatial	expansion	of	respondents'	personal	network
Source: TRAFIG survey data, n=284
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which is how they were able to facilitate their passage. Others 
reported that opposition groups in Syria would bring a large bus 
that could transfer 40 to 50 people and demand that the Syrians 
leave, driving them to Jordan. The families in a household 
and neighbourhood would quickly organise themselves into 
large groups and travel on the busses together (SsInt-YU-RF-
014-JOR; SsInt-YU-RF-017-JOR; SsInt-YU-RF-018-JOR). This 
demonstrates that non-family networks may ‘fill in a gap’ of 
knowledge or trust when needed, but our qualitative inter-
views reveal that they cannot be relied upon in the same way as 
family- and kin networks can.  
Most of our respondents (85.1%) reported that they departed 
from their home in Syria with close family members (spouse, 
parents, children, siblings; see also Betts & Collier, 2017 on 
forced migration as familial decision), while 12.5 per cent 
departed alone. During the journey out of Syria, only a small 
amount of our respondents (6.6%) were involuntarily separated 
from family members on their journeys while the remainder 
were able to choose to stay together or voluntarily separate. 
Thus, we argue that mobility patterns and family- and kin  
networks are importantly interlinked.
Mobilising connections to leave Zaatari refugee 
camp
Most of our interviewees who had entered Jordan irregularly 
were sent to Zaatari refugee camp by the Jordanian authorities 
who patrolled the border areas. All those we interviewed who 
came through Zaatari described hating the camp. Some even 
said that upon seeing and experiencing Zaatari, they would 
have been better off if they had died in Syria (SsInt-YU-RF-
016-JOR; SsInt-YU-RF-020-JOR). 
Our research suggests that mobility out of Zaatari and kin net-
works were highly intertwined. Roughly, there were two groups 
of Syrians in Zaatari: Those with extended family in Jordan 
and those without. For group two, their only means of leaving 
Zaatari was to “skip out” and leave without formal permission, 
knowing that they were jeopardising their legal status in Jordan 
and their ability to receive UNHCR assistance (before the regu-
larisation discussed above).
Members of group one were able to leave Zaatari under the 
kafala, or “sponsorship” system. All of our interviewees 
arrived in Jordan before the suspension of kafala, and many 
reported that their extended family networks in Jordan were 
a key element in their mobility out of Zaatari. One woman we 
interviewed (SsInt-YU-RF-016-JOR) stated that kafala had 




This section looks into Theme 3 of TRAFIG: “Connectivity and 
mobility in the context of protracted displacement.” The main 
question of this section is, “How do translocal and transna-
tional networks shape refugees’ mobility experiences, trajecto-
ries and aspirations, and how do specific legal frameworks and 
policies enable or inhibit this mobility?” In this section, we first 
look at the familial and non-family connections Syrians mo-
bilised to leave Syria and enter Jordan. Second, we look at the 
family- and kin networks that Syrians mobilised to move within 
Jordan. Finally, we consider onward aspirations, more than the 
actual plans, of our Syrian respondents while considering the 
role of family- and kin figurations. We also draw out important 
distinctions between those who live in urban areas and those 
who live in camps..
Mobilising connections to leave Syria and enter 
Jordan
Nearly all of our respondents (94.1%) reported that the most 
important reasons for leaving Syria were insecurity, war and 
violence. When asked about the reasons for fleeing from Syria, 
the answer was so self-evident that one respondent answered, 
“Sorry – your question is weird! It’s the war, the destruction! 
People are dying and are being slaughtered and you’re asking 
why I moved from there?!” (BInt-YU-WA-005-JOR). 
The most compelling factors for movement into Jordan are  
1) geographic proximity (82.8% of our quantitative sample cited 
this reason); 2) pre-existing ties, including economic/work ties, 
cultural/linguistic/religious (57.8%); and 3) family networks of 
Jordanians and Syrians who had already moved to Jordan (15.2%).
The majority of our respondents (72.9%) indicated that they 
received some non-family support en route to Jordan, and 11.9 
per cent paid smugglers for this assistance. Opposition groups 
in Syria played a significant role in securing safe passage to 
the Jordanian border (SsInt-YU-ahmad-003-JOR, SsInt-YU-
ahmad-001-JOR; BInt-YU-TA-001-JOR). One person reported 
that the opposition groups used to keep a list of names of people 
who wanted to go to Jordan (SsInt-YU-ahmad-001-JOR). 
One interviewee did not name the opposition groups as such, 
but he said a “group of like-minded people” assisted him, his 
wife, and their only son in their passage to Jordan (SsInt-YU-
ahmad-003-JOR). He reported that the group gave them free 
transportation, food and drink, and safely presented them to 
the Jordanian military for refugee processing. He said: “This 
group of people has permissions to travel to the border areas,” 
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and onwards to the United Kingdom. Her parents utilised ex-
tended family networks to move to Doha, Qatar. She is now in 
Jordan with her youngest son, who goes to school. She feels like 
she has lost everything: She lost a well-paid job in the United 
Arab Emirates and, because her family members used the 
multiple family- and kin networks for onward migration, she 
is also now alone with one son in Jordan with family members 
as far-flung as the Gulf and Europe. This case suggests that kin 
networks are ambiguous: While they can facilitate transnational 
migration and domestic mobility, they can also result in some 
family members moving on and leaving others behind.
Return to Syria
According to our survey data, the vast majority (83 per cent) 
of Syrian refugees does not intent to return to Syria within 
the next two years. Of those living in camps, only 12 per cent 
have intentions to return to Syria for good. Return rates from 
Jordan are very low (<35,000 overall; Edwards & Al-Hourani, 
2019; UNHCR, 2018). Some of our interview respondents 
reported living in fear of involuntary return as a form of 
punishment or banishment for breaching host country laws or 
forfeiting the conditions regulating their refugee status, such as 
working without a legal permit. Such fears are well-founded: 
International organisations concur that hundreds of Syrian 
refugees, including children, have been forcibly returned to 
Syria (Achilli, 2015; Molnar, 2020). Due to the strict security 
conditions in refugee camps, the threat of involuntary return 
is a governance strategy addressing camp-based refugees who 
fear being deported to Syria if found in breach of regulations.
The decision to stay in Jordan is not always an easy one and is 
often fraught with trauma and post-traumatic stress caused by 
events in Syria, even as life in Jordan presents new challenges. 
A few women we interviewed said that they would not go back 
to Syria in the near future because of traumatic war memories. 
One woman (SsInt-YU-RF-019-JOR) recounted how her mother 
was shot in front of the house and the family buried her body 
outside the house. She said, “I will return home someday and 
remember my mother outside that window.” In this case, we see 
the aversion to and desire for mobility intimately intertwined 
with family networks. 
sought to bring more family members from Syria to Jordan, 
through and out of the camp via the kafala system. However, 
she was unable to do so: By that time, in mid-2013, the border 
had closed. The quantitative survey supports this as well, with 
the most significant portion of respondents (38%) indicating 
that they received support from family or friends in Jordan to 
move to their current place of living.
According to our quantitative survey, 71 per cent of the 
respondents have network connections beyond their place of 
living, and 60 per cent are embedded in transnational net-
works beyond Jordan. However, the reporting of transnational 
networks varies tremendously by place of residence: While 90 
per cent of Mafraq city respondents indicated that they have 
transnational networks, only 16 per cent of Zaatari respondents 
stated the same. The low percentage of refugees reporting 
transnational networks currently in Zaatari confirms that those 
with more networks were better able to be mobile out of the camp. 
Of the Syrian families we interviewed, many, if not most, had 
extended family- and kin networks in Ramtha, which facilitated 
their movement there. Some interviewees such as Umm-Bahaa 
(BInt-YU-RF-001-JOR) in the introduction to this working 
paper stated that Ramtha has become a highly desired location 
for urban Syrian refugees in Jordan. In fact, so many Syrians 
from the Daraa region have now moved to Ramtha that one 
interviewee (SsInt-YU-RF-005-JOR) said: “Ramtha even looks 
like Daraa.” Two Syrian women we interviewed (BInt-YU-RF-
003-JOR; SsInt-YU-RF-010-JOR) described having multiple 
family- and kin networks that facilitated their and their families’ 
movements out of Zaatari and to Ramtha. Both their husbands’ 
families were in Irbid, so both sets of families thought they 
could get help from the family- and kin networks in Irbid. Then 
each moved to Irbid to join their husband’s families’ networks 
but ended up returning to Ramtha, preferring it to Irbid. This 
suggests that familial networks are selectively utilised to sup-
port settlement and integration processes (see Tobin et al. 2021 
for a detailed discussion of this).  
In another example, one woman we interviewed (BInt-YU-RF-
005-JOR) had previously worked in the United Arab Emirates. 
She had a secure financial status and lifestyle there. She had 
visited Syria a few weeks before the crisis because she was 
preparing for her son’s wedding to a locally-residing Syrian 
woman. She stayed with her two sons while her husband 
returned to the Emirates. When the refugee crisis began, she 
was stuck in Syria and unable to return. She fled irregularly 
to Jordan with her three sons, brothers and parents. They were 
immediately placed in Zaatari camp, but were later able to use 
kafala with local family members to leave. After some time, her 
two eldest sons went on to Turkey and fled illegally overseas 
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Some of the female Syrians interviewed expressed reservations 
about resettling in European countries due to perceived cultural 
differences, dress code and religious beliefs. A married woman 
in her forties explained that she did not apply for resettlement 
because she did not want to live in a Western country: 
I have no intention to leave Jordan; although my husband 
would like to travel to Canada so he could be relieved 
from work, but I refused to leave. I want to stay here (…). 
I have been approached by a young man and a woman 
from UNHCR (mofawadia), to apply for resettlement in a 
Western country, but I refused because I'm very comfort-
able living in Jordan; especially because I lived in Jordan 
for a while before the crisis. Additionally, here we have 
the same tradition, culture and dress, but there [the West] 
it is not like this. I can’t live in a non-Arab country (SSInt-
YU-RH-001-JOR).
Transnational networks and mobility aspirations
Some families are now split because some members returned to 
Syria while others stayed in Jordan, and some family mem-
bers moved even further away. As a result of Syrian translocal 
family networks, most of those we interviewed on this theme 
(90%) expressed some desire to travel outside Jordan to re-
kindle and protect family- and kin networks (some interviews 
with extended discussions include SsInt-YU-RF-012-JOR; 
SsInt-YU-RF-013-JOR; SsInt-YU-RF-014-JOR). 
As demonstrated in Figure 6, most of our respondents main-
tain connections in Syria (31%). Beyond Syria, transnational 
connections include North America and Europe (32%), Gulf 
countries (21%) and other Middle Eastern countries (11%).
Resettlement and asylum
Recent literature on transnational migration has emphasised 
social actors’ ability to be mobile (Black & King, 2004; Jeffery 
& Murison, 2011; Piper, 2009). However, Syrian resettlement 
rates are very low, with only 176,000 having been resettled 
worldwide (UNHCR, 2019a). In 2019, only 5,500 Syrians in 
Jordan were granted asylum by UNHCR to a third country 
(UNHCR 2019d). 
While onward migration to the Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) is 
generally unrealistic, many still consider it a desirable outcome. 
Overwhelmingly, the Gulf countries have not accepted Syrians 
with refugee status; instead they prefer to send resources to 
other Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan to house and 
aid refugees there (Hitmas, 2019). Yet, up to 1.5 million Syrian 
have been admitted to the Gulf countries, however, not as 
refugees but rather as migrant working “brothers” to live, work 
and study (Nowrasteh, 2019). Working as a migrant in the Gulf 
countries is often associated with high-income (mainly profes-
sional) jobs, daily life in an Arabic-speaking and Muslim ma-
jority country and family visas for those whose income passes 
the threshold. Obtaining mobility to the Gulf has required work 
contracts and visas, which some extended family members have 
been able to achieve. This is also discussed in Section 3.5.
Most Syrians in our study had not registered an application for 
resettlement. The low number of asylum applications (16%) 
may be because most of our sample is legally secure in Jordan, 
at least for the time being. 76 per cent are registered with 
UNHCR in Jordan, and nearly all are registered locally with the 
authorities (98.3%). Among those who have applied for asylum 
with UNHCR (16.8%), the most common countries they want 
to go to are the United States (34), Canada (20), the United 
Kingdom (12), with smaller numbers in various European  
countries, Sweden, Norway and Australia.
Among those we interviewed who had been offered resettlement, 
one had turned it down due to safety concerns and the adverse 
living conditions:  
(…) they called me to go to Spain, but I refused because 
we know some people who went there, they told us that 
life there is not good; they said that refugees there are 
not satisfied because they live in private rooms, where 




Source: TRAFIG survey data, n=167; Note: Only those who have connec-
tions beyond Jordan; 88 persons have no connections beyond 
their place of living
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Qualitatively, our interviewees told us that the United Kingdom 
was their preferred choice of resettlement. This is despite the 
fact that since 2015, the United Kingdom has admitted less than 
20,000 Syrians (Armbruster, 2019), thereby making these Syrians' 
prospects to be granted resettlement there nearly zero. While 
the number of reported transnational connections to the United 
Kingdom is smaller than those to many other countries, accounts 
by family members who had settled there were reportedly more 
positive. 
In the face of restricted onward mobility, compounded with 
severe challenges to building an economically viable and secure 
livelihood in Jordan, Syrian refugees often find themselves con-
templating, imagining and dreaming of better lives elsewhere, 
yet lack realistic pathways to realise these aspirations (Kvit-
tingen et al., 2019). Migration aspirations are not necessarily 
good predictors of Syrians’ ability to migrate because legal and 
political constraints prevent them from leaving Jordan (Caron, 
2020; Carling, 2002; Docquier, Peri, & Ruyssen, 2014; Carling 
& Schewel, 2018). 
Concluding	remarks
Translocal and transnational networks shape Syrian refu-
gees’ mobility out of Syria, into Jordan, within Jordan and in 
aspirations beyond Jordan. Family networks, combined with 
challenging conditions and limited prospects, can also prompt 
some Syrians to consider return to Syria. Family networks are, 
at times, ambiguous and can facilitate transnational migration 
or domestic mobility and leave others behind. Most respondents 
maintain connections to Syria, North America and Europe, the 
Gulf countries and other Middle Eastern countries.
Key findings
•	 Most Syrians in Jordan experience mobility as typically 
voluntary and limited to 1) out of Zaatari camp and/or  
2) within Jordan’s northern cities and semi-urban areas.
•	 Opposition political groups and family/kin networks in 
Syria played a critical role in helping people leave Syria 
for Jordan.
•	 Multiple family- and kin networks operate simultane-
ously within Jordan, which makes pathways of mobility 
dynamic and sometimes unpredictable. 
•	 Divided family- and kin networks between Syria, Jordan 
and beyond influence how Syrians envision and aspire 
onward mobility, compounded by the limited scope for 
third-country resettlement.  
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De facto integration
The case of Umm-Omar demonstrates that there is a “de facto 
integration” for Syrian in Jordan. Syrians often referenced 
shared language, culture (including food, wedding practices, 
forms of socialising, market practices, etc.), and religion as 
initial facilitators of local integration into the host society.  
56.9 per cent of our survey respondents fled to Jordan because 
the “language, traditions, and customs are similar to home.”  
As one said: 
Here, life is not very different from life in Syria. But I 
guess life here is a bit better. The traditions and customs 
are very much alike. The price of food is basically the 
same. Everything is available (...). Here, life is much safer 
(SSInt-YU-RH-003-JOR),
In the absence of durable solutions of resettlement or return, 
and in the presence of a protracted uncertainty about Syrians’ 
futures in Jordan, refugees and host communities must find 
ways to co-exist and co-habit. Thus, the often referenced simi-
larities between Syrians and Jordanians make de facto integra-
tion a feasible strategy. 
3.4	Building	alliances—Displaced	people’s		
integration	and	intergroup	relations	with	hosts
This section looks into Theme 4 of TRAFIG, “Building alli-
ances—Displaced people’s integration and intergroup relations 
with hosts.” The main question this chapter aims to address 
is: Which processes structure inter-group relations between 
refugees and hosts and displaces people’s pathways of local 
integration?” The previous section examined the role of family 
networks in processes of mobility, and this section examines 
how refugees build new contacts in the host community, either 
through family networks or place-based encounters and their 
experiences. These connections can help meet livelihood needs 
and reinforce family- and kin networks, and they provide a 
basis for what we call “de facto integration.” To introduce the 
findings for this Theme, we present the case of Umm-Omar.
Umm-Omar is a 49-year-old Syrian from Daraa. She is mar-
ried with four children. Even though she only had primary 
education (fifth grade), she used to have a job in Syria. At 
the time of the interview, she was not working outside the 
home. She lives in Ajloun and describes visiting relatives 
and friends in Irbid regularly. Umm-Omar indicated that 
her relationship with the Jordanian neighbours was “su-
perficial but affectionate” (“satheat wa leken hanoon") and 
that they exchanged visits from time to time. This is similar 
to 45 per cent of our survey respondents who indicated that 
they felt “somewhat” accepted by the people in the place 
where they live. Her relationships with Jordanians in places 
of worship were good, she said. However, her relationships 
with employers (when she gets the opportunity to work), with 
the landlord, and with the school staff was often hostile, and 
as she says, “racist.” Though her daily life is without conflict 
with the host community in her neighbourhood and vicinity 
in general, her family has had a difficult time feeling genu-
inely integrated into Jordanian society. She says:
We have become friends; we became companions. We 
deal with each other in a good way, respectful and 
well-intended. As for me, I love meeting with Jorda-
nian women (…). In Ramadan, you find Syrians and 
Jordanians together, and they met in the mosque, and 
some Jordanians would like to interact with Syrians, 
and there are some NGOs that conduct joint activities. 
We are all Muslims, and we are brothers in Islam.  
Honestly, when we brought our children from Syria to 
Jordan, our lives changed. In Syria, my sons were ex-
posed to and witnessed truly terrible things. Now they 
do not know joy or fun feelings after what they were 
Box	1:	The	Case	of	Umm-Omar	(SsInt-YU-KM-013-JOR)
exposed to previously. So my son had a conflict with 
a Jordanian friend, and they were about to fight. The 
Jordanian friend said to him: ‘You’re a refugee.’ And 
the Jordanian boy burned him with a cigarette. I was 
afraid for him to leave the house. My son was afraid 
to leave the house. So he stayed inside. And now it 
has been three years, and he still hasn’t returned to 
school. He dropped out. It has become normal. My 
son works now. Sometimes people do not pay him 
the entire wages (…). He’s afraid. So he avoids being 
exposed to a situation in which he will not be paid 
fully for his effort. He sometimes avoids going out to 
avoid potential fights with others. He started his life 
in Syria in fear and still lives in fear here in Jordan. 
He won’t even go to weddings, which is where you can 
really mix with people. Sometimes my sons have told 
me they want to return to Syria, but they feel afraid of 
the situation there, and they are not comfortable here 
either. My sons are mostly not social with others. We 
were in a very difficult situation, and it has caused 
psychological stress to my boys and me (…). I feel like 
we are being exposed to a kind of ‘racism.’ 
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Many attributed the lack of stronger relationships to a lack of 
programmes, initiatives or activities that would foster greater 
community harmony (SsInt-YU-KM-018-JOR). One inter-
viewee said, 
I haven’t participated, but I heard from Syrian women 
that there are courses available through Mercy Corps. 
They have programmes for young children and Jordanian 
and Syrian youth to teach them about photography and 
drawing. There are religious centres too, for example, the 
Qur’an memorisation centre. They can sit together and 
get to know each other. But these programmes are rare 
(SsInt-YU-KM-001-JOR).
Another source (SsInt-YU-KM-003-JOR) cited an agricultural 
programme that he had participated in with other Syrians and 
Jordanians and enjoyed very much. However, he—and most 
others—found the projects few and far between and hoped 
there would be more in the future (SsInt-YU-KM-004, 005, 
006-JOR). One had participated in a Qur’an memorisation 
course with Jordanian women and “loved it”; she attributed her 
increased interconnections with Jordanian women to the course 
(SsInt-YU-KM-005-JOR). 
Intergroup conflicts
Conflicts were, thus, most frequently attributed to competition 
over scarce resources and few jobs (SsInt-YU-KM-007, 010, 
011, 017, 018, 019, 020-JOR). Syrians also attributed negative 
encounters to racism (SsInt-YU-KM-002, 004, 005, 011, 013, 
019-JOR) or ignorance (SsInt-YU-KM-017-JOR) by Jordanians. 
However, one study reported that 96.7 per cent of Jordanians 
considered Syrian refugees in Jordan as brothers and neigh-
bours (Athamneh & Momani, 2016). Further, Baylouny (2020) 
indicates that while Jordanians blame Syrians for the country’s 
problems, they ultimately hold the government responsible for 
fixing those problems, and they criticised the government rather 
than the Syrians for not offering solutions.
Many Syrians also blamed children for the majority of the 
conflicts (SsInt-YU-KM-005, 009, 016-JOR). It was not only 
Umm-Omar who reported that her children had dropped out of 
school due to bullying. A 20-year-old Syrian male said: 
Oh, my Jordanian teacher? He hated it [teaching]. He 
wanted nothing to do with me. He had another job after he 
was done teaching anyway, and so he would leave early. 
So there were no lessons. I left school when there was a 
problem among students—Jordanians vs. Syrians (…). 
These are the problems between Jordanian and Syrian 
children. They insult each other and begin hating each 
other—he insults me, the Jordanian insults his father, and 
the Syrian says it back (SsInt-YU-KM-019-JOR).
“Good relations,” such as those articulated by Umm-Omar, 
were often defined as without active conflict and neighbourly, 
but not necessarily friendly or close. Nearly all of the respond-
ents on this theme (90% of interviewees; SsInt-YU-KM-
001-JOR through SsInt-YU-KM-020-JOR) said that they were 
able to engage in daily life in a relatively pleasant way with at 
least some interaction with their neighbours, market sellers, 
landlords, or other contacts. Daily interactions were most often 
defined by mutual respect, greetings and salutations. Some of 
our respondents’ Jordanian contacts are superficial and distant 
but respectful, such as a relationship with one’s landlord or 
in the mosque (SsInt-YU-KM-018-JOR), while others, less 
frequently, are disrespectful, such as the case of Umm-Omar 
above.
One often-reported reason for the distant relations between the 
Jordanian hosts and the Syrian refugees is that many Syrians 
feared being a burden on the economy and society in Jordan’s 
impoverished parts. Phrases such as “Jordanians can hardly 
meet their own needs, let alone help us to meet ours” (SsInt-
YU-KM-019-JOR) were repeated regularly. Syrians also 
noticed the rising prices of consumer goods for Jordanians. One 
interviewee (SsInt-YU-KM-001-JOR) said that she believed the 
distance between the two groups was attributable to the nega-
tive economic impact of the arrival of large numbers of Syrians 
on the local economy, causing the cost of living to rise sharply: 
“The children of Jordan – this is their land, their money and 
their livelihood.” Another said: “Jordanians are tired. They 
can’t accept others anymore” (SsInt-YU-KM-004-JOR). Yet 
another said: “We are a burden on them” (SsInt-YU-KM-
006-JOR). This demonstrates that perceived and real changes to 
local economies have enhanced the distance between Syrians 
and Jordanians.
Place-based interactions—From chance to  
cooperation
Some found that superficial relations have turned into some-
thing more substantial, such as neighbours becoming friends 
(SsInt-YU-KM-004-JOR). The degree of affection or deep-
ening of friendship was often based on relations of “helping” 
or “need.” For example, Syrians often spoke more highly 
of their relations when they were with someone who was 
helping them or when speaking of the notion that one could 
“call in” a favour. Some relations have developed because 
of the ability to purchase goods on credit ((SsInt-YU-KM-
001,008,017,010,006-JOR). Several said that they had developed 
close relationships with their landlords, who let them pay rent 
when they could and often also lent money when they were in 
need (SsInt-YU-KM-004, 017-JOR). 
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Concluding	remarks
Overall, Syrians have been able to achieve de facto integration 
in the host society. One of the most important assets for Syrian 
refugees has been their rapid settlement in the host society, 
which has provided them with a relatively safe and accessible 
environment where, according to many, they are treated with 
courtesy and respect. Nonetheless, conflictual relations with 
Jordanian hosts persist for at least some, despite a common 
language, religious and cultural ties that have otherwise 
eased their swift movement into Jordan society. The refugees’ 
relations with the host populations are amicable but distant; 
often, the relations grow stronger through trust-based economic 
ties and conflict resolution. Everyday safety is not a primary 
concern, but bullying among school-aged children has had 
significant adverse effects for some.
This example illustrates how education is negatively affected 
by contested relations within schools—a problem confirmed by 
other respondents (e.g. SsInt-YU-KM-004-JOR).
Resolving conflicts was another means by which relations 
could be deepened. In a case from Zaatari, one inter-
viewee said: Wherever I go, I feel I’m welcomed. Our 
community in the camp is very conscious and aware of the 
importance of building relationships. I still remember an 
incident that happened here in Zaatari. A car driven by a 
Jordanian hit the son of a neighbour. The car occupants 
didn’t leave the boy. They put him in a special hospital 
and took his family [and some neighbours] to the hospital 
in special cars. We reached the hospital, and by God, the 
hospital was full of [the driver’s] relatives. After that, the 
Jordanians and the neighbours came to the camp, begging 
the boy's family to drop their right [to pursue charges] 
and forgive the Jordanian driver. They did. I mean, this is 
an example that tells how we are accepted by the Jorda-
nians (SSInt-YU-ahmad-011-JOR)
Here, the respondent indicates that this shows goodwill by the 
Jordanians that he reported would deepen relations.
Prospects for the future
Some said that the relations would deteriorate (SsInt-YU-KM-
010-JOR) or weaken (SsInt-YU-KM-016-JOR; SsInt-YU-KM-
018-JOR). Some even believed that they would “collapse” in 
the future (SsInt-YU-KM-019-JOR; SsInt-YU-KM-020-JOR). 
Others were more optimistic: One indicated that intermarriage 
would result in closer ties between Jordanians and Syrians in the 
future (SsInt-YU-KM-017-JOR)
Onward migration aspirations were tied tightly to refugees’ 
experiences and expectations for refugee–host relations (SsInt-
YU-KM-008-JOR). For example, the decision to stay put and 
not to move is also a calculation against future uncertainties tied 
to relations with the host community. As one woman said:
I have not thought about going somewhere else because 
here [in Ramtha] you might find people who would help 
out. If I move to Irbid, for example, I might not be able to 
pay the rent of the house there. Here, even if I do not pay 
on time, the landlord may postpone the rent payment for 
two more months. If I do not have enough money to pay 
on time, I might bargain with the house owner before I get 
evicted. I may also be able to pay by instalments instead 
of just one payment (SsInt-YU-RF-002-JOR).
Key findings
•	 Syrians experience de facto integration in Jordan due to 
shared language, religious, and socio-cultural ties.
•	 Some Syrians reported distancing from Jordanians as 
they felt and feared burdening host communities.
•	 Syrians forge new ties with the host community through 
trust-based relations, including housing rentals, conflict 
resolution and NGO-facilitated engagements.
•	 Conflicts are common among school-aged children and 
adversely affect educational prospects.  
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Migrant labour and remittances 
Some Syrians report receiving remittances from families or 
relatives abroad. Exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, but it 
is believed that up to 30 per cent of Syrian households receive 
informal money transfers, both domestically and internation-
ally (Tiltnes, Zhang, & Pederson, 2019). Among our survey 
respondents, 16 per cent indicated that transnational remit-
tances were a primary or secondary source of income. Gulf 
countries are the main source of funds for Syrians in Jordan 
(50%) followed by funds from Syrians in Syria to Syrians in 
Jordan (17%).
Families we interviewed are pursuing a mixed strategy of local 
support, regional employment, and international migration. 
To this end, those who have been able to take advantage of job 
openings in Gulf countries support their families by sending 
remittances. An example of this is a family with five children 
where the husband works in the Gulf: 
My husband works in Kuwait. He supports us. We do 
not receive support from any other source. I have two 
brothers here in Jordan. Two of my husband’s sisters 
are here in Jordan, one in Irbid and the other in Ramtha 
(SsInt-YU-WA-002-JOR).
 In this case, the remittances are sufficient to support the family, 
in other cases, remittances help pay house rents (SsInt-YU-WA-
004-JOR), yet both cases underline the importance of employment 
abroad and remittances for household viability. Remittances can 
offset familial poverty and improve livelihoods. 
Vocational training
UNHCR and others offer a range of vocational training courses 
and options to refugees (SSInt-YU-RH-001-JOR). In some 
cases, NGOs provide the training and transport for free, making 
it easier for more women to take part (Durable Solutions 
Platform, 2020). When transportation costs are not covered, 
it makes it all the more challenging for Syrians to attend, and 
many lack foreknowledge of the transportation benefit. Not-
withstanding transportation costs, many women cannot attend 
because of childcare needs. 
Syrians indicated that the main problem is finding work after 
graduation (SSInt-YU-RH-002-JOR) and the training is not 
directly associated with work opportunities (FGD-YU-RF-
001-JOR). Some men complain of not being able to afford to 




This section looks into Theme 5 of TRAFIG, “Seizing Oppor-
tunities—Development incentives and new economic interac-
tions.” The main overarching question for this theme is: “What 
are the economic impacts of protracted displacement situations 
and transnational figurations in the medium and long-term, and 
how can policies contribute to maximising development effects?” 
By the end of 2019, nearly 300,000 registered Syrian refugees 
were of working age, and approximately half of them were 
issued a work permit (UNHCR, 2019c). However, estimates 
of the number of Syrians working without a work permit in 
Jordan are disputed and range from 85,000 to 330,829 (Razzaz, 
2017). Many Syrian acknowledge that work permits are avail-
able to them but do not know how to access them or get a job 
with them (International Labour Organization, 2017; Higher 
Population Council, 2018; Fallah, Krafft, & Wahba, 2019; 
Stave & Hillesund, 2015). Work permits are also underutilised 
because of the fear that employers might not want to take on the 
necessary time and costs to complete the processes for a permit, 
especially if the job is a short-term or temporary one (Tobin & 
Alahmed, 2019). With the likely chance of being detected and, 
if found violating regulations, Syrians can be sanctioned or 
deported, which adds to security concerns (Molnar, 2020).  
Among our survey respondents, 47.2 per cent had worked for 
pay during the previous 30 days, but only about half had work 
permits (26%). This indicates that at least some of our respond-
ents are working without a permit. Among those who worked, 
the majority reported their pay came from formal employment 
with a contract (45%), while 35 per cent reported working 
without a contract and informally. 
Overwhelmingly, those who worked without a contract and 
informally were from out-of-camp peri-urban and urban 
areas (93%). By contrast, among those who reported formal 
employment with a regular contract, 84.6 per cent were from 
Zaatari. This is yet another area where the in-camp/out-of-camp 
differences emerge: Out-of-camp survey respondents more 
frequently reported employment precarity than those living in 
Zaatari.
Various economic interactions and development incentives in-
clude Syrians in Jordan and have an impact on Syrians’ abilities 
to secure their livelihoods. We focus on six key areas: 
1.	 Migrant labour and remittances;
2.	 Vocational training; 
3.	 Near-camp employment and Cash-for-Work in Zaatari;
4.	 Urban employment; 
5.	 Competition with other labour groups;
6.	 Transforming local markets and trade linkages.
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Urban employment
Many male urban refugees have found employment in low-paid 
and low-skilled (service sector) professions in the informal 
sector (FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR; International Labour Organi-
zation, 2017; Simpson & Abo Zayed, 2019). The same applies 
to young boys and school dropouts who are working as helping 
hands in supermarkets and grocery shops. Almost none of the 
urban refugees reported being employed through government 
and NGO programmes or on-the-job training schemes. 
Some reported that being formally registered as a worker will 
prevent you from receiving assistance from UNHCR and  
(I)NGOs, which is a regularly occurring fear that prevents at 
least some Syrians from applying for work permits (Interna-
tional Labour Organization, 2017). One respondent (BInt-YU-
TA-001-JOR) indicated that once he mentioned that he had 
an irregular part-time job, he was marked as unqualified for 
aid support even though he has six children. He then became 
worried that this would also affect his asylum application. With 
an unemployment rate of 60 per cent among Syrians in Jordan 
(Tiltnes, Zhan, & Pederson, 2019), the lack of viable work 
options and pervasive job market exclusion and concerns push 
many Syrians to the informal sector. 
A quote from a married woman in her fourties illustrates that 
the lack of labour market access limits work options for women, 
particularly married women:
I have no job. I looked for a job, but I haven’t been able to 
find one so far. I’m still looking for one. I have some skills 
as a coiffeur, so I can work in a beauty shop if I were 
given the chance. I also have some skills as a tailor. I can 
also teach and be a tutor. I have no health problems that 
prevent me from working (SsInt-YU-WA-005-JOR).
Options for employment are scarce. This is seconded by a 
young female student in her 20s (SsInt-YU-WA-004-JOR): 
“The options for legal employment are very rare here. Only 
illegal employment is possible. And the salaries are very low.” 
Another problem for women’s employment is that jobs may  
require working long hours for low pay and involves commuting 
with little net benefit: 
I once got an offer through a friend of mine ( …). We were 
paid only six JOD a day. I had to pay most of the amount 
I receive from work for commuting. I could only save one 
JOD a day! (SsInt-YU-WA-016-JOR). 
For others, work options outside of the home may be circum-
scribed by cultural proscriptions. This is reflected in this quote 
from a married woman in her mid-thirties: "It is shameful in my 
family for a woman to work outside the home" (SsInt-YU-WA-
020-JOR).
Near-camp employment and Cash-for-Work  
Programme
The refugees who live in Zaatari report challenges in finding 
work and complain about the unfair distribution of jobs within 
the camp (SsInt-YU-ahmad-014-JOR). Some of the residents 
can find work in the fields surrounding the camp, which tech-
nically requires a valid work permit. However, there are also 
informal work-for-pay schemes in farming projects outside 
the camp for a daily wage of five JOD (approx. US $7). Almost 
one-quarter (23%) indicated that they work (with and without a 
permit) in agriculture projects as a primary or secondary source 
of income.
The employment options within the camp are scarce and come 
primarily from the Cash-for-Work Programme (Tobin & Otis 
Campbell, 2016). In the Cash-for-Work Programme, camp 
residents who “volunteer” for NGOs receive a standard stipend 
that is determined by whether the work is deemed highly skilled 
(2 JOD/hr), skilled (1.50 JOD/hr) or unskilled (1 JOD/hr). Each 
“volunteer” may work for six hours per day. A few Zaatari res-
idents complained that favouritism and wasta (“connections”) 
play a major role in awarding the Cash-for Work positions 
(SsInt-YU-ahmad-014-JOR). In the words of one resident:
I applied for a job as a guard more than once, but there 
is cronyism in recruitment within the camp. (…). I filed 
a complaint with the commission, but they did not take 
any action. Only God can help me (SsInt-YU-ahmad-
007-JOR).
Camp residents also complain of being qualified but neither 
being selected nor offered Cash-for-Work employment. Most 
Cash-for-Work contracts are limited to three and six months to 
allow for available work to be rotated among residents (Tobin & 
Otis Campbell, 2016).
The same complaint emerged on the issue of work permits both 
inside and outside of the camp, a procedure that involves getting 
security clearance for those who live in Zaatari:
Here, we are governed by security reports and work per-
mits. By God, even the work permits are issued through 
cronyism (wasta). (…) Getting a work permit is totally 
dependent on having wasta. There are many people in the 
camp who have wasta outside the camp, with influential 
people in the local community, and they ask for labour for 
a specific job outside the camp.” The scarcity of jobs also 
reflects the common complaint that most of the available 
jobs in the Mafraq governate are picked up by outsiders 
from Amman or Irbid (SsInt-YU-ahmad-013-JOR). 
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(…) the Syrians have a positive impact, look around you, 
in each corner in this area you will see a shop, restau-
rant owned or operated by Syrians, and they improve its 
quality. For example, if you know ‘Al-Sunbula Bakery’ 
how [bad] it was before and how [good] it became after 
it was owned and operated by Syrians (...) (SsInt-YU-TA-
005-JOR).
According to our Syrian respondents, Syrians' influx led to a 
rise in rent for local apartments, benefitting Jordanian landlords 
but burdening the tenants (FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR; BInt-YU-
TA-001-JOR; SsInt-YU-TA-001-JOR). Others pointed out that 
housing-related expenses, such as cooking gas, had become 
costly for Jordanian and Syrians alike (SsInt-YU-TA-006-JOR).
Another issue raised in focus groups was that the Syrian refu-
gees had created well-paying jobs for the Jordanians who are 
working with the international aid agencies and NGO’s who 
provide health services and other supported services. However, 
the Syrians themselves are not benefiting from these opportu-
nities to the same degree as the Jordanians. One potential cause 
is that according to the Jordanian labour laws, some managerial 
potions are restricted to Jordanian nationality holders (e.g.  
FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR).
Concluding	remarks		
This section argues that the impact of Syrian refugees on the 
economy is multifaceted for the Syrians themselves and the 
local Jordanians. Formal labour with valid work permits is 
difficult to obtain, especially for those in urban areas. A general 
lack of job opportunities, combined with restricted access and 
cultural proscriptions, pushes many out of the labour market, 
especially women, or into informal labour in restricted sectors, 
which carries additional risks. Finding labour for Zaatari 
residents is extremely challenging because of limited contracts 
offered to a select few. As a result, Syrian refugees in Jordan 
also rely upon remittances and migrant labour as a supportive 
source of necessary income.
Some mentioned that business owners prefer Syrian labour be-
cause they are more flexible, work under pressure and have good 
communication skills in dealing with customers (SsInt-YU-TA-
011-JOR). Jordanian businesses also profited from the surplus 
Syrian labourers who will typically accept lower wages and 
longer working hours than their Jordanian peers (SsInt-YU-TA-
001-JOR; SsInt-YU-TA-004-JOR; FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR; BInt-
YU-TA-001-JOR). Some Syrians described this as “exploitation” 
(FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR). As one respondent described it: 
(…). The problem is that when I was searching for a job, 
the business owners offered me the minimum wages with 
12 working hours per day (…) even though it is not enough 
to live off (SsInt-YU-TA-002-JOR).
Competition with other groups
Our data supports studies that show that Syrian labour more 
often creates competition with other foreign workers (mainly 
Egyptians) than with local Jordanians (BInt-YU-TA-001-JOR; 
FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR; SsInt-YU-TA-006-JOR; see also 
Razzaz, 2017). Jordanian labour may even increase due to the 
“hiring quotas” in the Jordan Compact that guarantee employ-
ment rates among Jordanians (Tobin & Alahmed, 2019). Some 
respondents mentioned that Syrians work informally in some 
professions that are closed to them (such as hairdressing) and 
that they tend to charge their customers competitive prices 
(SsInt-YU-TA-002-JOR). Others work in restricted sectors 
such as mobile phone shops, but they do it in partnership with 
Jordanians to obtain the required license. In this case, the Jor-
danian partner may benefit from this partnership with no ma-
terial input (SsInt-YU-TA-002-JOR). However, joint business 
ventures can be risky and prone to fraud and exploitation with 
limited options for seeking redress (SsInt-YU-TA-004-JOR).
Transforming local markets and trade linkages
The respondents reported that the Syrians brought new ideas to 
certain sectors, including the food industry, service and hospi-
tality sectors and the construction sector in the interior decora-
tion of buildings and apartments (FGD-YU-TA-001-JOR). 
One area in which Syrian economic activity has increased is the 
food and hospitality sector. Some interviewees indicated that 
there had been many “Syrian chefs” before the Syrian Crisis. 
These Syrian chefs were locally known for mastering skills in 
Middle Eastern cooking, and they earned a good income in gen-
eral. As a result of the Syrian crisis, many Syrians now work in 
the food and hospitality industry either with current and new 
businesses and in restaurants (SsInt-YU-TA-001-JOR; FGD-
YU-TA-001-JOR). Some commented on the general improve-
ment this brought to the food and hospitality sector in Jordan:. 
Key findings
•	 Economic growth and opportunities were felt most in the 
food and hospitality, housing, and the international aid 
and NGO sectors.
•	 Syrians are challenged to access the labour market in 
legal, dignified and meaningful ways, often competing 
with other migrant laborers or even with Jordanians.
•	 The long history of economic ties between Syria and 
Jordan has helped Syrians and Jordanians establish 
collaborative trade and labour relations.
•	 Camp-based refugees have the fewest job opportunities 
and economic interactions with the host society.   
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considering the strain and fragmentation of family networks, 
mobility trajectories within Jordan were not necessarily predict-
able. Family networks were influenced and even supplanted 
by economic need and reception by the host society, which 
impacted mobility. As a result, once a Syrian family had found 
a reliable landlord or neighbourhood, they would be less willing 
to “risk” a bad one, even if it meant being farther away from 
family- and kin networks. 
Female heads of households merit a closer examination. Their 
lived experiences influence their future aspirations, connections 
with family networks and make them consider their sons’ dis-
tinctive security needs (e.g. that return to Syria would result in 
their forced conscription). In Mafraq, Jordanian–Syrian  
relations are deep-rooted by decades of intermarriage relations 
and commerce. With relevance to mobility, our findings in-
dicate that female Syrian refugees there were less inclined to 
resettle within Jordan or emigrate abroad than women inter-
viewed in other governorates in Jordan. We believe that this is 
due to the familiarity of Mafraq given their own backgrounds. 
The interviewed women’s main goal is to secure a better edu-
cation and improved living conditions for their families, and 
many women in female-headed households believed that this 
could be best achieved in Mafraq.  
4.3	Trust-based	interactions
Our research has shown that trust-based interactions were one 
of the first forms of non-familial solidarity engendered within 
new groups of Syrians, for example as they left Syria and 
entered Jordan. Trust-based interactions extend to relations 
between Syrians and Jordanians, as demonstrated in mobility 
patterns, social interactions, economic cooperation and 
market-based interactions. These trust-based interactions of 
non-familial solidarity may well expand into larger networks of 
support for Syrians and Jordanians alike.
The challenge is that many of these relations begin on an un-
equal footing: Jordanians are often in positions of power as the 
lessors, creditors, and owners. Syrians, as the borrowers and 
renters, are in less powerful positions. Yet, these relationships 
can yield enhanced and deeper interactions between Syrians 
and Jordanians because they are based on trust. An examination 
of trust-based relationships in more detail and in different 
contexts would reveal much about the integration processes, of 
creating new connections and growing social networks. Doing 
so with an eye to the power differentials is also warranted as a 
means to demonstrate the longer-term impacts on Syrians and 
their future lives in Jordan.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the five main themes of TRAFIG 
research. Clearly, the themes are closely interconnected. Here 
we examine some of the cross-cutting findings and emerging 
trends that we discerned in the case of Syrians in Jordan. 
Please note that these findings have not been at the focus of our 
research but have emerged from our data analysis and merit 
follow-up research.
4.1	Defining	“culture”	in	assessing	mobility
The cultural, religious and linguistic ties between the host- 
and sending countries has contributed to ambivalent mobility 
aspirations. “Cultural similarity” is often glossed as the same 
language, religion, family- and kin relations and political and 
historical backgrounds, which Syrians share with Jordanians. 
Refugees themselves often express desires to stay in places 
where they share these aspects of their everyday dealings with 
the host community. However, when questions about culture 
are expanded to include larger perceptions of “the good life”, 
including longevity and health care, access to and equity in 
merit-based systems for economic activity and livelihoods, rights 
to religious practice and freedoms of speech, etc., refugees prefer 
onward mobility. Despite the similarities between Syrians and 
Jordanians, many Syrian refugees expressed a desire to move 
to European, North American, or Gulf countries, searching for 
the, sometimes idealised, “good life”. Thus, future research that 
challenges simplified explanations of “culture” and approaches 
mobility aspirations holistically can reveal much about the 
Syrian case..
4.2	The	mobility–integration	nexus
In the absence of durable solutions for Syrians in Jordan, and 
in the midst of their protracted stay, Syrians have become de 
facto integrated into Jordanian society. Many of the respondents 
indicated that they had superficial but affectionate relations 
with the host community, though they are not very deep. A 
cross-cutting question that emerges is: “To what degree does 
integration impede or facilitate mobility?” In other words, are 
those less integrated more likely to be mobile? And are those 
more integrated less likely to be mobile? 
Our preliminary analyses indicate that those who moved out of 
Zaatari, for example, did so because they had family connec-
tions who sponsored them (kafala). However, once outside the 
camp, mobility patterns changed, and it was no longer that 
straightforward to follow family-based trajectories. Especially 
4.	Cross-cutting	findings	and	emerging	trends
TRAFIG working paper no. 6  •  03/2021  •  28
4.6	Vulnerability	and	COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a new and uncharted 
factor that has an impact on Syrian refugees in Jordan. At the 
beginning of the pandemic, the Jordanian government enacted 
some of the world’s strictest lockdown and quarantine measures. 
They included country-wide curfews, prohibiting the movement 
outside of one’s own home, including bans on driving or even 
taking out one’s waste, and systematic government distribution 
of food and medicine to the entire country. Over the months to 
follow, these measures were lifted and instead implemented in 
targeted hotspots. However, fears of widespread outbreaks that 
could overwhelm the underserviced health care service have 
persisted. While the extreme lockdown measures were received 
quite well domestically, they proved unsustainable for the 
longer-term livelihoods of the 750,000 Syrian refugees in the 
country, resulting in adverse outcomes for the Syrians. 
Our survey data show the economic impacts of the Jordanian 
government's prevention measures on Syrian refugees. In 
Figure 7, we see that nearly all respondents were affected socio- 
economically (91%), with many experiencing a reduction in 




In Theme 4, we were surprised to find that NGO-facilitated 
gatherings of Syrians and Jordanians were so well-received  
as a strategy for introductions and prompting interconnections.  
Respondents referred several times to religious classes and Qur’an 
memorisation courses. Syrian respondents also mentioned addi-
tional classes in building soft skills, vocational training, and even 
casual gatherings of various kinds as conducive to facilitating 
introductions and engendering support for integration. We suspect 
that these classes are important as they alter the terms for inte-
gration experiences from needs-based forms of dependency and 
support to that of equal status in a shared-learning environment. 
Future research into processes of integration would benefit from a 
deeper investigation of these forms.
4.5	Gendered	experiences	of	protracted		
displacement
In our qualitative and quantitative samples, women are slightly 
better represented than men are (55:45). Beyond discussing 
women’s vulnerabilities as heads-of-households, personal con-
cerns for safety and their roles and responsibilities as mothers 
and caretakers of the home, our analyses have thus far not 
focussed on the distinctly gendered experiences of women. A 
more gendered perspective would enrich our understanding of 
women’s experiences of protracted displacement.
Figure	8:	Defining	translocal	figurations	of	displacement	along	five	core	themes
Figure	7:	Livelihood	impact	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic	
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Transnational	links	improve	livelihoods	and	
household	viability
The study has demonstrated that transnational linkages are 
common in the sample and influence both migration aspirations 
(where to go), timing (when to go) and the cost–benefit of 
seeking asylum in third countries (whether to go). Families with 
members who are employed abroad benefit from remittances 
that assist them as they secure their livelihoods. However, 
there are indications that divorce rates may increase following 
displacement. Transnational linkages are familial but may also 
be commercial and professional, as demonstrated by the role 
of pre-conflict trade links between Jordanians and Syrians and 
post-conflict joint ventures. Enabling transnational relations 
may increase potential income streams, mobility- and asylum 
options that, in the longer term, could offset a reduction in aid 
to Syrian refugees and ease the strain on host countries such as 
Jordan.
Differences	between	Zaatari	and	out-of-camp
The study shows that there are distinctive differences between 
Zaatari-based refugees and those outside the camp. Work 
opportunities are scarce and often precarious and temporary for 
those in Zaatari. Zaatari-based refugees are the least translo-
cally and transnationally connected and compare unfavourably 
with Syrians in urban areas who are better connected and inte-
grated with the host population. Zaatari-based refugees suffer 
from security concerns and distinctive uncertainties about their 
futures. The hardships of Zaatari camp make them more likely 
to consider return to Syria than those living outside camps. 
In few cases, families’ translocal strategies—dual residence 
in camp and city—help overcome the challenges of residency 
in Zaatari while maximising benefits. In more general terms, 
the findings support UNHCR’s “Alternatives to Camp” policy, 
which seeks to replace camp-based responses with bolstered 
support for non-camp refugees (2014).
Job	openings	are	scarce	and	should	be		
expanded
There are limited job opportunities, especially for women, 
which makes Jordan’s labour market very challenging. Al-
though Jordanian nationals, migrant workers and Syrian 
refugees each have unique skills, characteristics and tradi-
tional work domains, the semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
compete for limited job opportunities. Skilled or professional 
workers often do not compete because Jordanian labour law has 
protected those sectors, keeping them closed to non-nationals. 
The main research question of the TRAFIG research is: “How 
are protractedness, dependency and vulnerability related to the 
factor of local and translocal connectivity and mobility, and in 
turn, how can connectivity and mobility be utilised to enhance 
self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of displaced people? 
(Etzold et al., 2019). The hypothesis underlying this question is 
that “the more connected and mobile refugees, IDPs, and other 
migrants are, the less likely they are to experience protracted 
displacement. Conversely, the less connected and the more 
immobilised displaced persons are, the greater the risk that they 
are vulnerable, dependent, and become stuck in precarity.” How 




Syrian refugees are unable to return home because of danger, 
instability and political threats. They are unable—and, at 
times, unwilling—to resettle in third countries and are, instead, 
granted residency permits from the Jordanian government that 
grant access to work in certain sectors, health and schooling. 
Additionally, UNHCR and aid organisations provide (govern-
ment-sanctioned) emergency aid and protection for refugees. 
The assistance offered has significant gaps, leaving many Syrians 
challenged to secure their livelihoods now in the context of an 
uncertain future. Despite these limitations, the Syrian refugees 
experience a de facto integration in Jordanian society and host 
communities. Pre-war trade relations and post-displacement 
economic ties have eased economic integration, with camp-
based refugees the least integrated.
Better	connected	families	tend	to	fare	better
Family- and kin networks play a mixed role vis-à-vis connec-
tivity and mobility within this context of future uncertainty. 
Generally, those with pre-existing (pre-Syrian crisis) relation-
ships and experiences (work, family or leisure) in Jordan and 
with Jordanians fared better in terms of connecting and inte-
grating with the host population. Those who live in the Zaatari 
refugee camp had less contact with the host population and 
relied more on close family networks with whom they actively 
co-habit and congregate. Among urban Syrians, by contrast, 
immediate family members were more often dispersed across 
Jordan and transnationally, reflecting their greater mobility and 
transnational linkages. Family networks proved vital in secu-
rity provision during displacement from Syria and into Jordan 
and during resettlement from refugee camps to the urban areas. 
However, family networks alone have not resolved the need for 
durable solutions to protracted displacement. 
Conclusions	and	outlook
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The problem of unemployment among Syrians is exacerbated 
by Jordan’s high unemployment rate and, more generally, 
low wages and long working hours and commutes. This has 
long-term livelihood implications for the Syrians' protracted 
displacement in Jordan and underscores the importance of 
expanding job creation for refugees under the Jordan Compact. 
Education	is	desired	but	not	accessed	by	all
This study has demonstrated the importance refugee families 
place on accessing quality education. The majority of Syrian 
refugee families hail from rural areas and are semi-skilled or 
unskilled workers with a modest educational background. How-
ever, most value education and desire to enrol their children in 
primary schools. Public schools are free for Syrians in Jordan, 
but their low quality and conflicts with the host community 
children make private schools a preferred alternative for the 
minority that can afford it. The low returns on education, com-
bined with economic hardships and bullying, increase drop-out 
rates and child-labour. Only very few are enrolled in tertiary 
education supported by scholarships. Even though many have 
completed vocational training courses, they do not necessarily 
help to obtain jobs after completion.   
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